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A (SOCIAL) SCIENTIFIC LOOK AT ECOSYSTEM-
BASED MANAGEMENT 
Porter Hoagland* 
NATURAL EXPERIMENTS: ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT.  By Judith A. Layzer.  Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 2008.   
 
A recent book,1 a number of articles,2 a consensus statement,3 a web 
page,4 and an interim framework for coastal and marine spatial planning 
in the United States,5 signal the maturation of the movement to spread 
the word of ecosystem-based management (EBM).  According to a 2005 
scientific consensus statement, EBM is an integrated, place-based 
management approach that focuses on maintaining the integrity or 
enhancing the resilience of an entire ecosystem, including its structure, 
                                                          
* Senior Research Specialist, Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution. 
 1. ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT FOR THE OCEANS (Karen L. McLeod & Heather 
M. Leslie eds., Island Press 2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Heather Tallis et al., The Many Faces of Ecosystem-Based Management: 
Making the Process Work Today in Real Places, 34 MARINE POLICY 340 (2009); Katie K. 
Arkema et al., Marine Ecosystem-Based Management: from Characterization to 
Implementation, 4 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 525 (2006); and Anne D. 
Guerry, Icarus and Daedalus: Conceptual and Tactical Lessons for Marine Ecosystem-
Based Management, 3 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 202 (2005). 
 3. KAREN L. MCLEOD ET AL., SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON MARINE 
ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT (2008), www.compassonline.org/pdf_files 
/EBM_Consensus_Statement_v12.pdf. 
 4. Ecosystem-Based Management Tools Network, About Ecosystem-Based 
Management, http://www.ebmtools.org/about_ebm.html (last visited Jan 11, 2010). 
 5. INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE, INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE 
COASTAL AND MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING 7 (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/091209-Interim-CMSP-Framework-Task-Force.pdf (“[Coastal 
and Marine Spatial Planning] would use an ecosystem-based management approach that 
addresses cumulative effects to ensure the protection, integrity, maintenance, resilience, 
and restoration of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems, while promoting multiple 
sustainable uses.”). 
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functioning, processes, and dynamics.6  EBM accounts explicitly for both 
intra-system and inter-system linkages, considers cumulative impacts, 
and is adaptive.7  Importantly, according to the web-based EBM Tools 
Network, EBM “engages multiple stakeholders in a collaborative process 
to define problems and find solutions.”8 
EBM should be contrasted with the failed management approaches 
that focus on single species or single sectors.9  It has now become 
commonplace to criticize the governance of large-scale environments, 
such as the coastal ocean, as being too centralized but also too 
fragmented.10  Commentators have argued that single-species fishery 
management and myopic alignments of special interests with captured 
agencies (the so-called “single sectors”) have been the norm, and policies 
and politics have led to inefficient and inequitable outcomes.11  EBM has 
now been put forward as a science-based solution to the problems of 
governing large-scale environments or ecosystems.12 
With all of its promise, however, there has been little evidence to 
date of the effectiveness of EBM.13  Scientific complexities and the need 
to establish novel institutions for governance pose significant 
                                                          
 6. McLeod & Leslie, supra note 1, at 4. 
 7. Intra-system linkages would comprise biological relationships, such as predator-
prey, competition, commensalism, among many others, as well as dependencies on 
environmental conditions.  Inter-system linkages would comprise connections among 
distinguishable ecosystems in the air, in the water, and on the land. 
 8. ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT TOOLS NETWORK, supra note 4. 
 9. Guerry, supra note 2, at 209 (citing the impossibility of managing components of 
marine ecosystems in isolation). 
 10. See generally INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 1-2; 
JOINT OCEAN COMMISSION INITIATIVE, FROM SEA TO SHINING SEA: PRIORITIES FOR OCEAN 
POLICY REFORM (2006), http://www.jointoceancommission.org/resource-center/1-
Reports/2006-06-13_Sea_to_Shining_Sea_Report_to_Senate.pdf; US COMMISSION ON 
OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004), 
http://oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf; PEW 
OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE 
(2003), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ 
ocean_life/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf. 
 11. Ellen K. Pikitch et al., Ecosystem-based Fishery Management, 305 SCIENCE 346 
(2004). 
 12. E.g., Heather M. Leslie & Karen L. McLeod, Confronting the Challenges of 
Implementing Marine Ecosystem-Based Management, 5 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND 
ENVIRONMENT 540 (2007). 
 13. E.g., Tony J. Pitcher et al., An Evaluation of Progress in Implementing Ecosystem-
based Management of Fisheries in 33 Countries, 33 MARINE POLICY 223 (2008); Tallis et 
al., supra note 2, at 340.   
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challenges.14  More significantly, beneath EBM’s distinctively scientific 
façade, there may be poor justification for some of its underlying general 
principles.15  Of special concern is the purported value of stakeholder 
collaboration in planning for and implementing EBM.   
In NATURAL EXPERIMENTS, Judith A. Layzer, an Associate 
Professor of Environmental Policy in the Department of Urban Studies 
and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, takes a 
systematic look at the implementation of EBM in a wide range of 
contexts.16  Employing a case study approach, she questions especially 
the effectiveness of the collaborative planning aspect of EBM.17  (At 
least two of her cases, the Florida Everglades [“South Florida’s river of 
grass”] and the San Francisco Bay—Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta [the 
“California Bay-Delta”] should be of particular interest to specialists in 
coastal and ocean law and policy.)  She concludes that encouraging 
collaborative planning may in fact hinder the goals of EBM to conserve 
and restore ecosystems.  This striking result should make her book 
required reading for any serious student or practitioner of coastal or 
ocean governance. 
EBM is about the governance18 of large-scale environments or 
ecosystems, which may be defined on the basis of their distinctive 
ecological features.  Notably, the study of what constitutes good 
governance is gaining popularity in the social sciences.  For example, the 
award of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics to Elinor Ostrom of Indiana 
                                                          
 14. E.g., Heather M. Leslie et al., Is a New Mandate Needed for Marine Ecosystem-
Based Management?, 6 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 43 (2008). 
 15. See, e.g., Augustin Berghöfer et al., Stakeholder Participation in Ecosystem-
Based Approaches to Fisheries Management: A Synthesis from European Research 
Projects, 32 MARINE POLICY 243 (2008) (finding that information flows, legitimacy, and 
social dynamics in EBM for fisheries are made more difficult because competent 
regulatory authorities and stakeholders are positioned in different sectors and at different 
governance levels).   
 16. See JUDITH A. LAYZER, NATURAL EXPERIMENTS: ECOSYSTEM-BASED 
MANAGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (MIT Press 2008). 
 17. Layzer considers three “core attributes” of EBM: addressing problems at a 
regional scale; collaborative planning; and flexible, adaptive implementation.  Together, 
these three attributes facilitate the conservation and restoration of ecosystem health.  Id. 
at 22-23.  Collaborative planning is defined as an assembly of public officials, private 
stakeholders, and scientists who voluntarily seek consensus of a solution that promises 
joint gains. 
 18. Governance comprises the policies, norms, responsibilities, decisions, and actions 
of a governing institution, including government agencies, nonprofit organizations, 
public-private organizations, and private firms.  In other words, governance is both the 
purpose of an institution and the carrying out of that purpose. 
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University19 signifies a growing importance to social scientists—
especially economists—of understanding what constitutes good 
governance.20  Layzer’s book is a good example of the kind of social 
scientific research urgently needed for developing insights into the 
design and implementation of effective EBM approaches in the future.   
In strict terms, governance per se involves the transactions costs of 
managing individuals or groups in the non-market setting found within a 
government agency or a corporate firm.21  Unlike the simplistic 
characterizations that find their way into much political rhetoric, there is 
no real ideological choice between either governments or markets.22  The 
relevant policy question is: what is the best combination of the two in 
any particular circumstance?23  In theory, the appropriate mix of 
institutions should evolve in a way that economizes transaction costs.24  
In practice, history, laws, cultural norms, the distribution and exercise of 
political power, technologies, and a host of other factors may interact to 
influence tradeoffs affecting the nature of governance.25 
Ostrom’s work helps elucidate the appropriate mix of institutions in 
the context of common-pool resource exploitation.  Common-pool 
resources are quasi-public resources for which potential users cannot be 
excluded but the resource can be over-used or even used up.  In 1968, 
                                                          
 19. The Nobel Foundation, Elinor Ostrom: The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/ 
laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 20. Good governance defines and secures property rights, allows the enforcement of 
contracts, and supplies public goods or mitigates public bads.  These three features of 
governance are undeniably essential for the proper functioning of markets and therefore 
deserving of the attention of economists and other social scientists.  Avinash Dixit, 
Governance Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 5 
(2009).   
 21. Transactions costs—especially in industrial organization—have been studied 
extensively by Oliver E. Williamson, the co-recipient of the 2009 Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences.  The Nobel Foundation, Oliver E. Williamson: The Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, http://nobelprize.org/ 
nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/williamson-lecture.html (last visited Jan. 11, 
2010). 
 22. AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTIONS-COST 
POLITICS PERSPECTIVE 28-31 (MIT Press 1996) (characterizing transactions-cost politics 
as a dynamic, evolutionary process).  Steven A. Murawski, NOAA’s Chief Science 
Advisor for Fisheries, also argues that EBM is a continually evolving form of 
governance.  Steven A. Murawski, Ten Myths Concerning Ecosystem Approaches to 
Marine Resource Management, 31 MARINE POLICY 681, 689 (2007). 
 23. Dixit, supra note 20, at 8. 
 24. DIXIT, supra note 22, at 32. 
 25. Id. 
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Garrett Hardin’s portrayal of the “tragedy of the commons” implied that 
centralized government control was one logical solution to the over-
exploitation of common-pool resources.26  This model was readily 
adopted in many jurisdictions, providing justification for the centralized 
regulation of fisheries, the control of water pollution, and the governance 
of other common-pool resources in the United States and other 
jurisdictions.27  In contrast, Ostrom’s work showed that when certain 
community and environmental characteristics are obtained, a common-
pool resource can be managed sustainably by the users.   
What is remarkable is the generalizability of Ostrom’s self-
governance result across many peoples in many economic circumstances 
who use many different types of resources.28  A critical aspect of 
Ostrom’s argument is the uniqueness of the socio-ecological context; 
self-governing institutions are better at handling the relevant transaction 
costs involved in managing local common-pool resources.  For these 
resources, centralized governance appears incapable of dealing with the 
idiosyncrasies of micro-environments and the peculiar interests of 
users.29   
For a self-governing system to arise, however, certain conditions 
(“general principles”) must exist.30  In broad terms, the transaction costs 
of dealing with other entities must be low enough that individual entities 
(typically members of the same community) can consult with one 
another in order to agree to conserve the resource sustainably.  Other 
conditions include agreement among users on how individual actions 
affect the resource as well as other users and low levels of uncertainty 
about resource stocks, flows, and distribution in time and space.  It helps 
if users are able to trust one another, perhaps because they have similar 
preferences and interests, live in the same community, or must engage in 
repeated interactions.   
                                                          
 26. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).  Hardin 
also posited the assignment of property rights and the establishment of a market in those 
rights as an alternative solution. 
 27. See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEANS POLICY, REVIEW OF U.S. OCEAN AND COASTAL 
LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE OVER THREE DECADES (2004), 
http://oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/append_6.pdf (reviewing the 
evolution of coastal and ocean law and policy during the last three decades). 
 28. See Jules Pretty, Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources, 302 
SCIENCE 1912 (2003) (finding that nearly one-half million groups have been established 
worldwide since the 1990’s to sustainably manage common-pool resources). 
 29. Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 
284 SCIENCE 278, 281 (1999). 
 30. Id. at 281. 
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Self-governing common-pool resource management is a logical 
progenitor of the EBM concept.31  This relationship is especially evident 
where advocates for the latter call for the engagement of multiple 
stakeholders in a collaborative process of problem definition and the 
identification of solutions.32  Such language clearly channels common-
pool resource self-governance.  An important—and testable—question, 
however, is whether or not the conditions that give rise to effective self-
governance for common-pool resources also occur for the large-scale 
ecosystems to which EBM might be applied. 
In her book, Layzer seeks to determine whether such conditions are 
indeed comparable with regard to what she considers to be the three 
“core attributes” of EBM: addressing problems at a regional scale; 
collaborative planning; and flexible, adaptive implementation.33  Her 
findings with respect to collaborative planning are especially noteworthy.  
Layzer refers to collaborative planning as one aspect of an “optimistic 
model” of EBM.34  She interprets the findings of her case studies to show 
the differences between the “optimistic model” and a more “pessimistic 
model” in which differences among stakeholders perpetuate conflict and 
reduce the likelihood that EBM will conserve ecosystems.35  
Layzer shows that there are few long-term benefits to collaborative 
planning, finding, in contrast to the “optimistic model,” that, even where 
collaboration is achieved, it is both inconsequential and attenuates over 
time.36  There are several reasons for this finding.  First, stakeholders 
tend to avoid the thorny issues that cause disagreement, such as evidence 
of ecological decline.  Instead, they redefine ecological problems in ways 
that tend to perpetuate the historical overuse of resources.  In particular, 
stakeholders tend to avoid incorporating local knowledge where it would 
highlight difficult tradeoffs and lead to choices favoring one user over 
another.  Almost by definition, stakeholder consensus cannot be built 
over issues where one user must relinquish political advantage.  In 
addition to these findings, Layzer uncovers little evidence of the use of 
adaptive management, increased stewardship, or durability of plan 
                                                          
 31. See, e.g., Thomas Dietz et al., The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCIENCE 
1907 (2003) (arguing that promising strategies for addressing environmental problems at 
non-local scales include “dialogue among interested parties, officials, and scientists”). 
 32. Id. at 1910. 
 33. LAYZER, supra note 16, at 22-23. 
 34. Id. at 23-28. 
 35. Id. at 28-32. 
 36. Id. at 272. 
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implementation.  Stakeholders appear to lean toward least-common-
denominator agreements: 
In cases where policymakers deferred to stakeholders to set 
goals, the policies and practices that emerged appear unlikely to 
conserve or restore ecological health because, to gain consensus, 
planners skirted tradeoffs and opted instead for solutions that 
promised something for everyone. . . By contrast, when 
policymakers—elected officials, administrators, or judges—
endorsed an environmentally protective goal and used regulatory 
leverage to prevent development interests from undermining that 
objective, the resulting policies and practices are more likely 
than their counterparts to conserve or restore ecological 
integrity.37 
This result is quite damning for EBM as it is currently understood, 
for it suggests that a centralized approach to governance may be superior 
to the stakeholder collaboration approach for large-scale ecological 
systems.  Given her conclusion, one clearly has to wonder about the 
ultimate fate of the brand new “Interim Framework for Effective Coastal 
and Marine Spatial Planning,” which has called for “frequent and 
continuous” stakeholder engagement in all phases from development to 
implementation of coastal and marine spatial planning.38  
A superficial reading of Layzer’s work might lead one to wonder 
whether the cases were hand-picked to justify the result or whether there 
is not yet enough experience with EBM to understand its logic.  Layzer 
may have sacrificed breadth for depth, as each of the case studies is quite 
carefully researched, but there are only seven of them.  It would have 
been interesting to have included other cases, such as the management of 
the Chesapeake Bay estuary, which Layzer argues was too incomparable 
due to the multiplicity of jurisdictions.39  In any case, the reader is left 
wanting more because even a moment’s reflection comes up with ocean 
examples that arguably could fit Layzer’s “pessimistic model.”  Among 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 284. 
 38. INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 14. 
 39. LAYZER, supra note 16, at 33.  Layzer does include a brief discussion of the 
ineffectiveness of management efforts to restore the Chesapeake, which after more than 
30 years of efforts remains seriously degraded.  Id. at 17, 287.  Interestingly, Layzer cites 
Bradley Karkkainen as one source of inspiration for the use of the term ”natural 
experiments” in her book’s title.  Id. at xii.  In contrast to Layzer’s interpretation, 
Karkkainen has pointed to the Chesapeake Bay program as a successful example of 
ecosystem governance.  Bradley Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Managment and a Post-
Sovereign Transboundary Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 113, 127 (2004).   
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these are President George W. Bush’s proclamation of the 
Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument in Hawaii, overriding 
years of stakeholder deliberations,40 and the difficulties of finalizing a 
management plan for the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary, a 
draft of which has been crafted through stakeholder deliberations.41   
These and other examples confirm what Ostrom and her colleagues 
characterize as the “scaling-up problem” in which larger numbers of 
stakeholders increase the difficulty of organizing the governance of a 
common-pool resource and agreeing to and enforcing rules for access, 
take, and investment.42  It is sensible to read Layzer’s conclusion not as a 
refutation of the important body of work on common-pool resource 
management but instead as an illustration of the inappropriateness of 
blindly borrowing outcomes from that field to apply to circumstances 
where they may be unlikely to hold.  Large-scale ecological problems are 
complex, involving a significant degree of uncertainty.  There are 
multiple interacting resources of varying quality to be managed, and the 
users are diverse and may not share similar preferences or reside within a 
well-defined community.  And as Layzer points out, “trying to 
coordinate numerous entities with no single agency or jurisdiction at the 
helm diffuses authority in ways that can impede progress.”43  
Layzer’s book should draw the attention of those who are serious 
about designing and implementing EBM.  Indeed, her stated purpose is 
not to disparage EBM but to increase the likelihood that, eventually, it 
can be utilized to advance ecological conservation.  The critical keys to 
this end are the promotion of a protective regulatory framework and 
strong pro-environmental leadership, both of which require a more 
centralized form of governance.  In this way, Hardin’s point about 
government control of the commons could be read as a broader metaphor 
for the governance of large-scale ecosystems.  With the right policies and 
                                                          
 40. Brian N. Tissot et al., Hawaiian Islands Marine Ecosystem Case Study: 
Ecosystem- and Community-Based Management in Hawaii, 37 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 
255 (2009), available at http://www.coralreefnetwork.com/kona/Tissot_Walsh_Hixon_ 
2009.pdf (finding that challenges to EBM in Hawaii include the limited extent of 
community involvement, the complexity of conflicts among diverse stakeholders, the 
weak enforcement of fishery regulations, and questions about the sustainability of 
synergy among government entities and scientists). 
 41. The revision of the management plan was initiated in July 2002 and a 388 page 
draft plan is still being reviewed by NOAA as of December 2009.  Stellwagen Bank 
National Marine Sanctuary, Draft Management Plan, http://stellwagen.noaa.gov/ 
management/mpr/draftplan.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 42. Ostrom et al., supra note 29, at 281. 
 43. LAYZER, supra note 16, at 284. 
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leadership, Layzer argues that negotiations among stakeholders could 
occur within a “hospitable” context.44  While this final statement 
provides some hope for EBM, Layzer realizes that political officials will 
continue to promote stakeholder collaboration precisely because it 
reduces their own political risks.45  “The trick for EBM initiatives,” 
according to Layzer, “is to capture the purported advantages of working 
at a landscape scale while harnessing at least some of the benefits of 
engaging stakeholders.”46   
                                                          
 44. Id. at 292. 
 45. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 14. 
 46. LAYZER, supra note 16, at 4. 
